From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 02 08:22:14 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fm2wC-0000BX-3u; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 08:15:12 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 02 Jun 2006 08:14:33 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.gmx.net ([213.165.64.20]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fm2us-0008LI-KT for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 08:13:50 +0200 Received: (qmail 21338 invoked by uid 0); 2 Jun 2006 06:11:51 -0000 Received: 88.96.109.78 by service.gmx.net with HTTP; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 08:11:51 +0200 (CEST) X-Flags: 0001 Message-ID: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Date: Fri, 02 Jun 2006 08:11:51 +0200 from: rodger ellis Subject: need some feedback please to: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org X-Authenticated: #31183477 X-Mailer: WWW-Mail 6100 (Global Message Exchange) x-priority: 3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_20 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: rellis@gmx.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Hello I don't see the point in encrypting / if you put all your personal data on the /home partition. Then / contains just the operating system, and that's nothing someone who steals your computer would be interested in. Is my thinking correct here? -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal für Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 02 11:58:28 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fm6QC-0001db-9o; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 11:58:24 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 02 Jun 2006 11:57:57 +0200 (CEST) Received: from web54003.mail.yahoo.com ([206.190.36.227]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fm6PT-0001Sz-Dc for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 11:57:39 +0200 Received: (qmail 12863 invoked by uid 60001); 2 Jun 2006 09:57:06 -0000 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Message-ID:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=rWLrY1VXUHGL5r9EzePJ72Wl6zOYuRPlcPM4O1/suGis9XOsIQpQLUvaQL28407fxhODC+HnEnzp91JxZT+GCiw/QZM220qBYfT3uWlDFjdW5vt2Ydvl2uYS8lZTemvIQJC2HKHdY31e/1HZTQdYHObOMFUoEJE8IjukdZ1LshM= ; Message-ID: <20060602095706.12861.qmail@web54003.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [87.203.175.54] by web54003.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 02:57:06 PDT Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 02:57:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil H Subject: Re: need some feedback please To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org In-Reply-To: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-859567234-1149242226=:12566" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: philtickle200@yahoo.com Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --0-859567234-1149242226=:12566 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Applications can write data of one sort or another to /tmp and configuration files and so on to /etc (and of course swap), or perhaps (clandestinely or not) to some other place that you don't expect. Also, the filesystem remembers when progs and files were last accessed and metadata gets stored in the journal for eg ext3 filesystems. It's perhaps a good thing that the journal gets rapidly overwritten during normal use. You could run lsof on everything to find out what files are being opened and written to, but the easier way to be 100% sure that data (or information about your data) is not being written in plaintext somewhere is to: 1) Encrypt the whole filesystem and swap, or 2) Run a livecd without swap and write no unencrypted data to your hard drive. In some ways (2) may be preferable since all you have then is an encrypted partition, which, as I understand it, is effectively impossible to distinguish from a randomly shredded partition. Someone correct me if I'm wrong. rodger ellis wrote: Hello I don't see the point in encrypting / if you put all your personal data on the /home partition. Then / contains just the operating system, and that's nothing someone who steals your computer would be interested in. Is my thinking correct here? -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal f�r Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com --0-859567234-1149242226=:12566 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Applications can write data of one sort or another to /tmp and configuration files and so on to /etc (and of course swap), or perhaps (clandestinely or not) to some other place that you don't expect.  Also, the filesystem remembers when progs and files were last accessed and metadata gets stored in the journal for eg ext3 filesystems.  It's perhaps a good thing that the journal gets rapidly overwritten during normal use.

You could run lsof on everything to find out what files are being opened and written to, but the easier way to be 100% sure that data (or information about your data) is not being written in plaintext somewhere is to:

1) Encrypt the whole filesystem and swap, or
2) Run a livecd without swap and write no unencrypted data to your hard drive.

In some ways (2) may be preferable since all you have then is an encrypted partition, which, as I understand it, is effectively impossible to distinguish from a randomly shredded partition.

Someone correct me if I'm wrong.
rodger ellis <rellis@gmx.net> wrote:
Hello

I don't see the point in encrypting / if you put all your personal data on the /home partition. Then / contains just the operating system, and that's nothing someone who steals your computer would be interested in.
Is my thinking correct here?
--


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Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
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- Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 02 18:31:41 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmCM7-0003Dq-N8; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 18:18:35 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 02 Jun 2006 18:18:10 +0200 (CEST) Received: from outbound-mail-49.bluehost.com ([70.96.188.18]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmCL7-0003Aa-Vy for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 18:17:34 +0200 Received: (qmail 27834 invoked by uid 0); 2 Jun 2006 16:10:46 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO box106.bluehost.com) (67.106.44.106) by mailproxy3.bluehost.com with SMTP; 2 Jun 2006 16:10:46 -0000 Received: from [65.247.243.2] (helo=fap) by box106.bluehost.com with esmtpa (Exim 4.52) id 1FmCEW-0004b9-KJ for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 10:10:45 -0600 From: fap@csociety.org To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: need some feedback please Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 11:10:37 -0500 User-Agent: KMail/1.8.2 References: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> In-Reply-To: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Message-Id: <200606021110.37398.fap@csociety.org> X-Identified-User: {942:box106.bluehost.com:redpartn:red-partner.com} {sentby:smtp auth 65.247.243.2 authed with fabian.perez@red-partner.com} Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,NO_REAL_NAME autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: fap@csociety.org Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto IMHO the answer is about your paranoia level. An unencrypted / partition will certainly give some intel about your data, whether in an encrypted partition or somewhere else. However, a cleverly mantained unencrypted / partition may be used as a decoy for a clean machine. Let me explain myself, the unencrypted / partition might mean that the machine doesn't need to encypher anything, therefore an uninteresting machine. However, if on the same machine you boot it with a Live OS and write to encrypted spaces of the disk, it might be possible to completely cloak the second use of the machine. Please, correct me if I'm wrong. On Friday 02 June 2006 01:11, rodger ellis wrote: > Hello > > I don't see the point in encrypting / if you put all your personal data on > the /home partition. Then / contains just the operating system, and that's > nothing someone who steals your computer would be interested in. Is my > thinking correct here? -- Ian - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 02 19:33:54 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmDWx-0001Mj-M9; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 19:33:51 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 02 Jun 2006 19:33:28 +0200 (CEST) Received: from 216-99-213-120.dsl.aracnet.com ([216.99.213.120] helo=clueserver.org) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmDLe-0000T5-M1 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 19:22:10 +0200 Received: by clueserver.org (Postfix, from userid 500) id CDCF1F50B97; Fri, 2 Jun 2006 09:51:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by clueserver.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAD2AF50039; Fri, 2 Jun 2006 09:51:22 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 09:51:22 -0700 (PDT) From: alan X-X-Sender: alan@blackbox.fnordora.org To: fap@csociety.org cc: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: need some feedback please In-Reply-To: <200606021110.37398.fap@csociety.org> Message-ID: References: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> <200606021110.37398.fap@csociety.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: alan@clueserver.org Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto On Fri, 2 Jun 2006, fap@csociety.org wrote: > IMHO the answer is about your paranoia level. An unencrypted / partition will > certainly give some intel about your data, whether in an encrypted partition > or somewhere else. However, a cleverly mantained unencrypted / partition may > be used as a decoy for a clean machine. Let me explain myself, the > unencrypted / partition might mean that the machine doesn't need to encypher > anything, therefore an uninteresting machine. However, if on the same machine > you boot it with a Live OS and write to encrypted spaces of the disk, it > might be possible to completely cloak the second use of the machine. The difficulty here is keeping the uncloaked OS form walking over the cloacked data in the encrypted section. If it is done as seperate partitions, then anyone looking at the drive with fdisk will see something else is there. If the encrypted data is in unused space, there has to be some way of keeping the other OS from writing over the data you want. Allocating the encrypted data as bad sectors perhaps? > > Please, correct me if I'm wrong. > > On Friday 02 June 2006 01:11, rodger ellis wrote: >> Hello >> >> I don't see the point in encrypting / if you put all your personal data on >> the /home partition. Then / contains just the operating system, and that's >> nothing someone who steals your computer would be interested in. Is my >> thinking correct here? > > -- "Waiter! This lambchop tastes like an old sock!" - Sheri Lewis - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sat Jun 03 14:39:27 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmVPZ-0003Si-K9; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 14:39:25 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sat, 03 Jun 2006 14:38:49 +0200 (CEST) Received: from amnistia.investici.org ([62.94.33.54]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmVOm-0003Rw-10 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 14:38:36 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by amnistia.investici.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13D8D4384 for ; Sat, 3 Jun 2006 14:09:31 +0200 (CEST) Received: from amnistia.investici.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (amnistia [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with SMTP id 09102-01-7 for ; Sat, 3 Jun 2006 14:09:30 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by amnistia.investici.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35512535C for ; Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:49:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from sideral by hashomer.fiasko.net with local (Exim 4.61) (envelope-from ) id 1FmA3h-0001pE-Og for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 02 Jun 2006 15:51:25 +0200 Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:51:25 +0200 From: "M. Kammerer" To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: need some feedback please Message-ID: <20060602135125.GA6748@hashomer> Mail-Followup-To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org References: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> <20060602095706.12861.qmail@web54003.mail.yahoo.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20060602095706.12861.qmail@web54003.mail.yahoo.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11+cvs20060403 Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: qad0t@altern.org Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Phil H@Fri, Jun 02, 2006 at 02:57:06AM -0700: > Applications can write data of one sort or another to /tmp and > configuration files and so on to /etc (and of course swap), or > perhaps (clandestinely or not) to some other place that you don't Encrypting the whole filesystem makes your binaries tamperproof. As mentioned in the mail quoted above, applications may do stuff you don't expect, and they may have even been maliciously changed so that they e.g. mail the important parts of your homedirectory to someone. All you need to do is to tamper with a programme, preferably daemon that runs as root. As soon as you mount your encrypted /home, it has full access and can do remote backups of any kind. There goes your privacy. greetings. Maxim - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sat Jun 03 19:41:23 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fma7j-0002xb-Nx; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:41:19 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:40:45 +0200 (CEST) Received: from ms-1.rz.rwth-aachen.de ([134.130.3.130] helo=ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fma6b-0002v7-7A for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:40:09 +0200 Received: from circe (circe.rz.RWTH-Aachen.DE [134.130.3.36]) by ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 Patch 2 (built Jul 14 2004)) with ESMTP id <0J0A00MH0P2LZN@ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de> for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:58 +0200 (MEST) Received: from talos.rz.RWTH-Aachen.DE ([134.130.3.22]) by circe (MailMonitor for SMTP v1.2.2 ) ; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:57 +0200 (MEST) Received: from enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (enterprise.ram.RWTH-Aachen.DE [137.226.68.2]) by smarthost.rwth-aachen.de (8.13.1/8.13.1/1) with ESMTP id k53HduFv020432 for ; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:56 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 560855B777 for ; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:57 +0200 (CEST) Received: from enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (enterprise [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 04562-09 for ; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:56 +0200 (CEST) Received: from tatooine.rebelbase.local (wintergate.ram.rwth-aachen.de [137.226.69.158]) by enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id D01545B775 for ; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:56 +0200 (CEST) Received: by tatooine.rebelbase.local (Postfix, from userid 500) id 75C806A843; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:55 +0200 (CEST) Date: Sat, 03 Jun 2006 19:39:54 +0200 From: markus reichelt Subject: Re: need some feedback please In-reply-to: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Mail-followup-to: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Message-id: <20060603173954.GF16538@dantooine> Organization: still stuck in reorganization mode MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/signed; boundary="Zs/RYxT/hKAHzkfQ"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha1 Content-disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 X-PGP-Key: 0xC2A3FEE4 X-PGP-Fingerprint: FFB8 E22F D2BC 0488 3D56 F672 2CCC 933B C2A3 FEE4 X-Request-PGP: http://mareichelt.de/keys/c2a3fee4.asc X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de References: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: ml@mareichelt.de Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --Zs/RYxT/hKAHzkfQ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable * rodger ellis wrote: > I don't see the point in encrypting / if you put all your personal > data on the /home partition. Then / contains just the operating > system, and that's nothing someone who steals your computer would > be interested in. Is my thinking correct here? Additionally to what's been said already: If one doesn't want to worry about adapting one's distro in such a way that no info whatsoever about /home is revealed, encrypting the system completely is the way to go. Lots of distros have some kind of cronjob by default to index files. Try running locate on a file you have in encrypted /home SSH session to my laptop: root@falcon:~# locate .muttrc /home/chef/.muttrc /home is encrypted and currently not mounted. Granted, it's all about one's paranoia level, but it's important to know both about possible drawbacks of only a partial system encryption and the means available/necessary to counteract its overall effects. --=20 left blank, right bald --Zs/RYxT/hKAHzkfQ Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEgclqLMyTO8Kj/uQRAqXMAKCGYY9DBk76pITSyTlpBNJXKlI0rwCghs93 Y1MVQn4z8MGeDOm8jtc00TM= =8KYa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Zs/RYxT/hKAHzkfQ-- - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sat Jun 03 21:27:25 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FmbmL-0002Zm-Ps; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:27:21 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:26:55 +0200 (CEST) Received: from services106.cs.uwaterloo.ca ([129.97.152.164] ident=root) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fmbia-0002NW-Fi for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:23:28 +0200 Received: from hopper.math.uwaterloo.ca (daemon@hopper.math.uwaterloo.ca [129.97.78.132]) by services106.cs.uwaterloo.ca (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k53Ilu6O015891 for ; Sat, 3 Jun 2006 14:47:57 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from hy3chan@localhost) by hopper.math.uwaterloo.ca (8.11.7/8.11.7) id k53Ils823754 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sat, 3 Jun 2006 14:47:54 -0400 (EDT) X-Mailer: emacs 22.0.50.1 (via feedmail 8 I) From: Hubert Chan To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: need some feedback please References: <20060602061151.211530@gmx.net> <20060602095706.12861.qmail@web54003.mail.yahoo.com> <20060602135125.GA6748@hashomer> X-Hashcash: 1:23:060603:linux-crypto@nl.linux.org::ERXK5p/bH5frJpvl:000000000000000000000000000000000001EJzR Date: Sat, 03 Jun 2006 14:47:50 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20060602135125.GA6748@hashomer> (M. Kammerer's message of "Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:51:25 +0200") Message-ID: <8764jijctl.fsf@evinrude.uhoreg.ca> User-Agent: Gnus/5.110004 (No Gnus v0.4) Emacs/22.0.50 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-2.0 (services106.cs.uwaterloo.ca [129.97.152.132]); Sat, 03 Jun 2006 14:47:59 -0400 (EDT) X-Miltered: at rhadamanthus with ID 4481D95C.001 by Joe's j-chkmail (http://j-chkmail.ensmp.fr)! X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV version 0.88.2, clamav-milter version 0.88.2 on localhost X-Virus-Status: Clean Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: hubert@uhoreg.ca Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto On Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:51:25 +0200, "M. Kammerer" said: > Phil H@Fri, Jun 02, 2006 at 02:57:06AM -0700: >> Applications can write data of one sort or another to /tmp and >> configuration files and so on to /etc (and of course swap), or >> perhaps (clandestinely or not) to some other place that you don't > Encrypting the whole filesystem makes your binaries tamperproof. ... It may make certain attack vectors harder, but it does not make it tamperproof. -- Hubert Chan - email & Jabber: hubert@uhoreg.ca - http://www.uhoreg.ca/ PGP/GnuPG key: 1024D/124B61FA (Key available at wwwkeys.pgp.net) Fingerprint: 96C5 012F 5F74 A5F7 1FF7 5291 AF29 C719 124B 61FA - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sat Jun 03 21:42:12 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fmc0f-0003Z3-8H; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:42:09 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:41:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.gmx.de ([213.165.64.20] helo=mail.gmx.net) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fmc03-0003IS-Jn for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:41:31 +0200 Received: (qmail 11980 invoked by uid 0); 3 Jun 2006 19:39:40 -0000 Received: 88.96.109.78 by service.gmx.net with HTTP; Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:39:40 +0200 (CEST) X-Flags: 0001 Date: Sat, 03 Jun 2006 21:39:40 +0200 Message-ID: <20060603193940.227070@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" from: rodger ellis Subject: thanks for feedback, but once computer is on? to: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org X-Authenticated: #31183477 X-Mailer: WWW-Mail 6100 (Global Message Exchange) x-priority: 3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: rellis@gmx.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Many thanks for all the feedbacks to my question. In the first instance aes-loop is the way to go, but once the computer is on and password has been applied then aes-loop has done its job -this is a very crude if perhaps incorrect assumption. Now what measures can be taken to protect your data? for example (not a very good one as this is the other exterme) but you run a mail server, i suppose EncFS might a step in the right direction. The circle I am trying to complete is encryption on a labtop against say theft or trusted parties abuseing that trust,(loop-aes) and finally trying to think of a way to protect data once the os is running. Rodger -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal für Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 04 04:20:29 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fmi5T-0007Zo-CQ; Sun, 04 Jun 2006 04:11:31 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 04 Jun 2006 04:11:00 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.gmx.net ([213.165.64.20]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fmi4n-0007Uz-7n for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 04 Jun 2006 04:10:49 +0200 Received: (qmail 8348 invoked by uid 0); 4 Jun 2006 02:08:58 -0000 Received: 84.175.55.201 by service.gmx.net with HTTP; Sun, 04 Jun 2006 04:08:58 +0200 (CEST) X-Flags: 0001 Date: Sun, 04 Jun 2006 04:08:58 +0200 Message-ID: <20060604020858.72010@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" from: Peter_22@gmx.de In-Reply-To: <447B1576.8E989339@users.sourceforge.net> References: <20060507213257.GA1238@dantooine> <4536.1147116034@www013.gmx.net> <446067A8.3040501@cbu.uib.no> <20060526210805.179940@gmx.net> <4479A00A.2070109@cbu.uib.no> <447AB849.4030307@cbu.uib.no> <447B1576.8E989339@users.sourceforge.net> Subject: Re: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU to: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org X-Authenticated: #5663700 X-Mailer: WWW-Mail 6100 (Global Message Exchange) x-priority: 3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,NO_REAL_NAME autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: Peter_22@gmx.de Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto > -------- Original-Nachricht -------- > Datum: Mon, 29 May 2006 18:38:30 +0300 > Von: Gisle Sælensminde wrote: > > A first step could be to describe loop-aes and cryptoloop, like done for > > the random-device in the paper I linked to. > Fine that you do this analysis of the loop-aes crypto system right now... But as you already assumed, I am not a crypto analyst. So far I trust in the aes cipher, gpg and Jaris work. As the userbasis is rather small I suppose the FBI didn`t do a code analysis yet. Looks fine, doesn`t it? Sure, I can`t write C or assembler code. Of course I don`t try writting loop-aes clones. So far I animated Jari to include instructions for using usb-sticks to boot from. Loop-aes can be set up to boot the system with no partition table. So there remains nothing that could tell attackers that you are using loop-aes. What looks crypto analysis like when you don`t know which kind of system you attack? Maybe you assume that loop-aes is used? In this case you still don`t know partitions or offsets. And of course you don`t know how many layers of encryption I used. Maybe I used 4 loops for some part of some disk... Again, I agree with your concerns about how loop-aes is taylored. But you still missed to give reasons why setting up more than one loop device per partition decreases security. Mixing up things always leads to a higher degree of freedom and this will decrease chances for crypto analysis, too. Right? Regards, Peter -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal für Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Mon Jun 05 16:57:48 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FnGWV-0000Gm-8i; Mon, 05 Jun 2006 16:57:43 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Mon, 05 Jun 2006 16:56:41 +0200 (CEST) Received: from alf.uib.no ([129.177.30.3] ident=exim) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FnGSw-00003g-3L for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Mon, 05 Jun 2006 16:54:02 +0200 Received: from 25.80-202-99.nextgentel.com ([10.0.0.3]) [80.202.99.25] by alf.uib.no for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.34) id 1FnGGK-0003bC-5e; Mon, 05 Jun 2006 16:41:02 +0200 Message-ID: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> Date: Mon, 05 Jun 2006 16:45:58 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Gisle_S=E6lensminde?= User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.7 (Macintosh/20050923) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-checked-clean: by exiscan on alf X-Scanner: d26ef1ddb1b881d573d3dffe0ba48335 http://tjinfo.uib.no/virus.html X-UiB-SpamFlag: NO UIB: -14.3 hits, 8.0 required X-UiB-SpamReport: spamassassin found; -15 From is listed in 'whitelist_SA' 0.7 RAW: Contains a line >= 199 long Received-SPF: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: Gisle.Salensminde@bccs.uib.no Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Peter_22@gmx.de wrote: >>-------- Original-Nachricht -------- >>Datum: Mon, 29 May 2006 18:38:30 +0300 >>Von: Gisle Sælensminde wrote: >> >> >>>A first step could be to describe loop-aes and cryptoloop, like done for >>>the random-device in the paper I linked to. >>> >>> > >Fine that you do this analysis of the loop-aes crypto system right now... > > Hmmm.... >But as you already assumed, I am not a crypto analyst. So far I trust in the aes cipher, gpg and Jaris work. As the userbasis is rather small I suppose the FBI didn`t do a code analysis yet. Looks fine, doesn`t it? >Sure, I can`t write C or assembler code. Of course I don`t try writting loop-aes clones. So far I animated Jari to include instructions for using usb-sticks to boot from. Loop-aes can be set up to boot the system with no partition table. So there remains nothing that could tell attackers that you are using loop-aes. What looks crypto analysis like when you don`t know which kind of system you attack? Maybe you assume that loop-aes is used? In this case you still don`t know partitions or offsets. And of course you don`t know how many layers of encryption I used. Maybe I used 4 loops for some part of some disk... > > > A common principle in design of cryptosystems is to use Kerkhoff's principle, which is to assume that everything about your system is known by an attacker, except the key. They may for example have read this mailinglist ;-). A comptent attacker would assume that a disk filled with randomness is encrypted, and then try to find clues of how the data is encrypted. Chances are that they will. >Again, I agree with your concerns about how loop-aes is taylored. But you still missed to give reasons why setting up more than one loop device per partition decreases security. Mixing up things always leads to a higher degree of freedom and this will decrease chances for crypto analysis, too. Right? > > > A direct answer to your question is that two layers of loopback encryption probably won't make your system less secure. On the other hand, it is not likely to make the system more secure either. If you want to have two layers of loopback on top of your disk, fine. It will lower the performance and give more overhaed for the user (you) in terms of key handling. If you are motiveted, that is just fine (and you probably are). The cipher is likely to already be the strongest link in the chain, and it is always the weakest link that breaks first. While several layers of encryption may not decrease security, it unlikely to buy you any additional security either, and that is my point. If every part of the system is strong enough (thus there is no weak link) fine. The point of analyzing the system is to detect such weak links, and that is unlikely to be the cipher. One such weak link in earlier versions of loop-aes (and as far as I know, still in cryptoloop) was the way each block were encrypted, that allowed an attacker to see the the location of the first change in each disk block when it changed. In that case, it would not have helped with several loop devices or double encryption. While the seriousness of the attack can be argued about, it shows that several layers of encryption may not help if an attack is on a different part of the system. - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Mon Jun 05 17:36:37 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FnH3b-0003NZ-CQ; Mon, 05 Jun 2006 17:31:55 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Mon, 05 Jun 2006 17:31:40 +0200 (CEST) Received: from alf.uib.no ([129.177.30.3] ident=exim) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FnGzf-0003Bg-DX for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Mon, 05 Jun 2006 17:27:51 +0200 Received: from 25.80-202-99.nextgentel.com ([10.0.0.3]) [80.202.99.25] by alf.uib.no for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.34) id 1FnGzZ-0007CD-M0; Mon, 05 Jun 2006 17:27:46 +0200 Message-ID: <44844E97.7000301@cbu.uib.no> Date: Mon, 05 Jun 2006 17:32:39 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Gisle_S=E6lensminde?= User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.7 (Macintosh/20050923) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> In-Reply-To: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-checked-clean: by exiscan on alf X-Scanner: 2648761003b6452fb31616489de4048f http://tjinfo.uib.no/virus.html X-UiB-SpamFlag: NO UIB: -15 hits, 8.0 required X-UiB-SpamReport: spamassassin found; -15 From is listed in 'whitelist_SA' Received-SPF: X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: Gisle.Salensminde@bccs.uib.no Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Gisle Sælensminde wrote: > One such weak link in earlier versions of loop-aes (and as far as I > know, still in cryptoloop) was the way each block were encrypted, that > allowed an attacker to see the the location of the first change in > each disk block when it changed. This may be interpreted as that you could read the plaintext due to this, which it would not let you. It would only let you see that only (say) the last x bytes changed, since only the bytes after that point changed on the disk block. Now the bytes before that point change too. This cannot be used to recover plaintext, but it can give a better granularity than the disk block for seeing what have changed where on the disk. It was nevertheless correct to change it, since it give more information about the underlaying data than desired. 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=EC=E7=F5 = =EB=E0=EF=20 =EC=F4=F8=E8=E9=ED

 

- Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Thu Jun 08 22:29:41 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FoQur-0003yM-Gs; Thu, 08 Jun 2006 22:15:41 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Thu, 08 Jun 2006 22:15:00 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mailgw.be.ch ([194.124.140.26] helo=mailgw-ext2.net.be.ch) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FoQpu-00081D-BI for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Thu, 08 Jun 2006 22:10:34 +0200 Received: from mailvirus-ext2.be.ch (unknown [10.251.249.68]) by mailgw-ext2.net.be.ch (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5343312B3 for ; Thu, 8 Jun 2006 22:09:17 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mailhub-ext1.net.be.ch (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mailvirus-ext2.be.ch (Postfix) with ESMTP id 082FC33A6 for ; Thu, 8 Jun 2006 22:09:17 +0200 (CEST) Received: from x3012msx005.infra.be.ch (x3012msx005.infra.be.ch [10.251.37.64]) by mailhub-ext1.net.be.ch (Postfix) with ESMTP id CEC5B977 for ; Thu, 8 Jun 2006 22:09:16 +0200 (CEST) Received: from X3012MSX001.infra.be.ch ([10.251.37.60]) by x3012msx005.infra.be.ch with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Thu, 8 Jun 2006 22:09:16 +0200 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C68B37.6AE6EAD0" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Subject: Abwesenheitsnotiz: [ SPAM ] Returned mail: see transcript for details Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2006 22:09:15 +0200 Message-ID: <6F235F1530B5954DBBEB2645F734C06008D469@X3012MSX001.infra.be.ch> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [ SPAM ] Returned mail: see transcript for details Thread-Index: AcaLN2rFBJYZS34ETWqAGaYGeoWAZAAAAAiR From: "Dreyer Marc, FIN-SV-DLZ SL" To: X-OriginalArrivalTime: 08 Jun 2006 20:09:16.0423 (UTC) FILETIME=[6B2D4970:01C68B37] Received-SPF: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_50,HTML_MESSAGE autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: marc.dreyer@fin.be.ch Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C68B37.6AE6EAD0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Guten Tag Bonjour Ich bin abwesend und ab DI 20.06.06 wieder da. Je suis absent et de retour le mardi, 20.03.06 Freundliche Gr=FCsse salutations Marc Dreyer ------_=_NextPart_001_01C68B37.6AE6EAD0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Abwesenheitsnotiz: [ SPAM ] Returned mail: see transcript for = details

Guten Tag        = Bonjour
Ich bin abwesend und ab DI 20.06.06 wieder da.
Je suis absent et de retour le mardi, 20.03.06
Freundliche Gr=FCsse   salutations   Marc Dreyer

------_=_NextPart_001_01C68B37.6AE6EAD0-- - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 09 04:35:02 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FoWpr-0008Rh-9c; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 04:34:55 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 09 Jun 2006 04:34:19 +0200 (CEST) Received: from tapuz.safe-mail.net ([213.8.161.230]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FoWgP-0007vQ-3v for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 04:25:09 +0200 Received: from www.Safe-mail.net by tapuz.safe-mail.net with Safe-mail (Exim 4.52) id 1FoWfp-0000KF-0C for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Thu, 08 Jun 2006 22:24:33 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=N1-0105; d=Safe-mail.net; b=fotQXKeVoHy0EFWApa3UsV6LtbYipazlzkLyaNDaKrKMOLiCzxhxKMnghWdGSmJj aF5EWnvGqgu8/ei3cbnVMoIgf+sIxySX+P3b4MPPod1N0NDxBuPQzkpUNyPmDcUH HszTt52uXFrcoaARVE9/g14KleMq65YmKuEoetvZQ88=; Received: from pc ([84.130.242.11]) by Safe-mail.net with https Subject: test--linux-crypto reachable or not Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2006 22:24:31 -0400 From: reverend@Safe-mail.net To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org X-SMType: Regular X-SMRef: N1-3RkqhFewZy Message-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SMSignature: Tk/jymX92KK7nmcdKmZuwhqqmccsg2FV9BebjlDTCgk4BfKtIN71BRj5o4Xl+xAN pa7Ncxjvf4l06HbOeqU6AvxelZpFpdWF/U6jtIg4MvkzsPElmaYCReq4pPoPmh5e /Uf3tHoqZuZPPXi96THas62kFSj/EZjw3v4r8/BARnk= Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_20,NO_REAL_NAME autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: reverend@Safe-mail.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto test, --------ignore if visible. - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 09 10:20:17 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FocDy-0001cg-7J; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:20:10 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:19:20 +0200 (CEST) Received: from web54008.mail.yahoo.com ([206.190.36.232]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FocCu-0001Yb-Ql for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:19:04 +0200 Received: (qmail 17346 invoked by uid 60001); 9 Jun 2006 08:12:30 -0000 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Message-ID:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=kqRVZvBeF0+Frp7qrjd8FjiN5F3s3OF0MksEy5SOQdV9ZB7IKH2yYize/fvHX2j+6c/T/86Mb+oncKIJpf9egHjdjX4wy/yhDyouYh/V9APhceo+bP1R+Cu6NssEB6afnVXuuCOMI2nkoK5NsHuQqGm+r+tXHAWRF2z8YCsq/y8= ; Message-ID: <20060609081230.17344.qmail@web54008.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [87.202.116.7] by web54008.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 01:12:30 PDT Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2006 01:12:30 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil H Subject: Re: thanks for feedback, but once computer is on? To: rodger ellis , linux-crypto@nl.linux.org In-Reply-To: <20060603193940.227070@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-1441049812-1149840750=:90041" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: philtickle200@yahoo.com Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --0-1441049812-1149840750=:90041 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit I don't follow your question. if you are asking how you protect your data while the OS is running and a loop-aes encrypted partition is mounted, you walk away from your laptop and someone walks up and reads your data - well obviously you shouldn't walk away from your laptop when an encrypted partition is mounted. If you are asking how do you protect your mounted encrypted partition from an attack over a network, then that's a network+desktop security issue rather than a loop-aes issue. Obviously if an attacker has root access and your partition is mounted then they can read/alter that data. My undretsanding is that it's best to unplug yourself from any network while using any kind of encryption, even from the power line if paranoid. For extreme paranoia, the machine should never ever be connected to any network and should be physically isolated (ie kept in a vault!). rodger ellis wrote: Many thanks for all the feedbacks to my question. In the first instance aes-loop is the way to go, but once the computer is on and password has been applied then aes-loop has done its job -this is a very crude if perhaps incorrect assumption. Now what measures can be taken to protect your data? for example (not a very good one as this is the other exterme) but you run a mail server, i suppose EncFS might a step in the right direction. The circle I am trying to complete is encryption on a labtop against say theft or trusted parties abuseing that trust,(loop-aes) and finally trying to think of a way to protect data once the os is running. Rodger -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal f�r Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com --0-1441049812-1149840750=:90041 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit I don't follow your question.

if you are asking how you protect your data while the OS is running and a loop-aes encrypted partition is mounted, you walk away from your laptop and someone walks up and reads your data - well obviously you shouldn't walk away from your laptop when an encrypted partition is mounted.

If you are asking how do you protect your mounted encrypted partition from an attack over a network, then that's a network+desktop security issue rather than a loop-aes issue.  Obviously if an attacker has root access and your partition is mounted then they can read/alter that data.

My undretsanding is that it's best to unplug yourself from any network while using any kind of encryption, even from the power line if paranoid. For extreme paranoia, the machine should never ever be connected to any network and should be physically isolated (ie kept in a vault!).



rodger ellis <rellis@gmx.net> wrote:
Many thanks for all the feedbacks to my question.

In the first instance aes-loop is the way to go, but once the computer is
on and password has been applied then aes-loop has done its job -this is a very crude if perhaps incorrect assumption. Now what measures can be taken
to protect your data? for example (not a very good one as this is the other exterme) but you run a mail server, i suppose EncFS might a step in the
right direction.

The circle I am trying to complete is encryption on a labtop
against say theft or trusted parties abuseing that trust,(loop-aes) and finally trying to think of a way to protect data once the os is running.


Rodger

--


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Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
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http://mail.yahoo.com --0-1441049812-1149840750=:90041-- - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 09 10:37:21 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FocUZ-0002fh-Eu; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:37:19 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:36:47 +0200 (CEST) Received: from web54005.mail.yahoo.com ([206.190.36.229]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FocJ7-0001vj-9l for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:25:29 +0200 Received: (qmail 22574 invoked by uid 60001); 9 Jun 2006 08:24:24 -0000 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Message-ID:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=3RRLi4bH7KepHfuk+irIH1aM01nyIRyYFbObzoRYZeB21rud6vD91fxAxvLXc0Yz+mrXQ3HVO9Pk1mFFjgt8XFiENEn/FJAELWqegZ0NxwqJIWeMjDM3Kf4viL0OaXMh/IOEVTVQfuAUCdvjLHtPLppMIJWT3YsJa8YERnBChps= ; Message-ID: <20060609082424.22572.qmail@web54005.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [87.202.116.7] by web54005.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 01:24:24 PDT Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2006 01:24:24 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil H Subject: Re: need some feedback please To: Hubert Chan , linux-crypto@nl.linux.org In-Reply-To: <8764jijctl.fsf@evinrude.uhoreg.ca> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-1042817643-1149841464=:21715" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: philtickle200@yahoo.com Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --0-1042817643-1149841464=:21715 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Interesting discussion. By not tamperproof, I imagine you are referring to the type of attacks where an attacker does something to the first portions of ciphertext in order to trick the user into revealing their password? I can't help wondering if it shouldn't be possible to hash the entired encrypted device and seperately gpg encrypt that hashfile in order to subsequently detect whether or not the ciphertext on the device had been tampered with? PS: When I was referring to live cd use I of course neglected to say the idea is that the livecd is kept secure so that OS binaries are not tamperable. Hubert Chan wrote: On Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:51:25 +0200, "M. Kammerer" said: > Phil H@Fri, Jun 02, 2006 at 02:57:06AM -0700: >> Applications can write data of one sort or another to /tmp and >> configuration files and so on to /etc (and of course swap), or >> perhaps (clandestinely or not) to some other place that you don't > Encrypting the whole filesystem makes your binaries tamperproof. ... It may make certain attack vectors harder, but it does not make it tamperproof. -- Hubert Chan - email & Jabber: hubert@uhoreg.ca - http://www.uhoreg.ca/ PGP/GnuPG key: 1024D/124B61FA (Key available at wwwkeys.pgp.net) Fingerprint: 96C5 012F 5F74 A5F7 1FF7 5291 AF29 C719 124B 61FA - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com --0-1042817643-1149841464=:21715 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Interesting discussion.

By not tamperproof, I imagine you are referring to the type of attacks where an attacker does something to the first portions of ciphertext in order to trick the user into revealing their password?

I can't help wondering if it shouldn't be possible to hash the entired encrypted device and seperately gpg encrypt that hashfile in order to subsequently detect whether or not the ciphertext on the device had been tampered with?

PS: When I was referring to live cd use I of course neglected to say the idea is that the livecd is kept secure so that OS binaries are not tamperable.




Hubert Chan <hubert@uhoreg.ca> wrote:

On Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:51:25 +0200, "M. Kammerer" said:

> Phil H@Fri, Jun 02, 2006 at 02:57:06AM -0700:
>> Applications can write data of one sort or another to /tmp and
>> configuration files and so on to /etc (and of course swap), or
>> perhaps (clandestinely or not) to some other place that you don't

> Encrypting the whole filesystem makes your binaries tamperproof. ...

It may make certain attack vectors harder, but it does not make it
tamperproof.

--
Hubert Chan - email & Jabber: hubert@uhoreg.ca - http://www.uhoreg.ca/
PGP/GnuPG key: 1024D/124B61FA (Key available at wwwkeys.pgp.net)
Fingerprint: 96C5 012F 5F74 A5F7 1FF7 5291 AF29 C719 124B 61FA


-
Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/


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http://mail.yahoo.com --0-1042817643-1149841464=:21715-- - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 09 10:46:35 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FocdV-0003L4-Ax; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:46:33 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:46:04 +0200 (CEST) Received: from web54002.mail.yahoo.com ([206.190.36.226]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Foccl-0003DQ-NN for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 10:45:47 +0200 Received: (qmail 8132 invoked by uid 60001); 9 Jun 2006 08:43:51 -0000 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Message-ID:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=4fKbT7EEjjB1kSXouqmj71xP10xekYnfHMhxeA8MwbbNE4LNWuoWWi6qeTBouGaKEK+wAj41132rXwyLG3yQ0QoKoHpaTcmFXlb+C+WhWDmpJc17CwWL9jgnvQkhTTt9V8UmjmVTU2DFZZ5yikSjHmET/ESx7iVLoNAJlMmWUZE= ; Message-ID: <20060609084351.8130.qmail@web54002.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [87.202.116.7] by web54002.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 01:43:51 PDT Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2006 01:43:51 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil H Subject: Distinguishability of encrypted partition To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-1023494426-1149842631=:7796" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: philtickle200@yahoo.com Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --0-1023494426-1149842631=:7796 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The recent threads on deniability etc lead me to ask: Just how distinguishable from random data is a loop-aes encrypted partition? I had assumed these were effectively indistinguishable. Or does it boil down to a question of just how "random" is random? I'm not sure I follow (in discussions about deniability) why a user cannot simply say they shredded that partition .... __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com --0-1023494426-1149842631=:7796 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The recent threads on deniability etc lead me to ask:

Just how distinguishable from random data is a loop-aes encrypted partition?

I had assumed these were effectively indistinguishable.  Or does it boil down to a question of just how "random" is random?

I'm not sure I follow (in discussions about deniability) why a user cannot simply say they shredded that partition ....

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Regards, Valentina Nwosu. - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Fri Jun 09 19:36:41 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FokuS-000346-82; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 19:36:36 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Fri, 09 Jun 2006 19:36:14 +0200 (CEST) Received: from services106.cs.uwaterloo.ca ([129.97.152.164] ident=root) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fokth-00030V-PJ for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 09 Jun 2006 19:35:49 +0200 Received: from hopper.math.uwaterloo.ca (daemon@hopper.math.uwaterloo.ca [129.97.78.132]) by services106.cs.uwaterloo.ca (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k59HZJjt023035 for ; Fri, 9 Jun 2006 13:35:20 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from hy3chan@localhost) by hopper.math.uwaterloo.ca (8.11.7/8.11.7) id k59HZHw11088 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Fri, 9 Jun 2006 13:35:17 -0400 (EDT) X-Mailer: emacs 22.0.50.1 (via feedmail 8 I) From: Hubert Chan To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: need some feedback please References: <8764jijctl.fsf@evinrude.uhoreg.ca> <20060609082424.22572.qmail@web54005.mail.yahoo.com> X-Hashcash: 1:23:060609:linux-crypto@nl.linux.org::bx59uSGWZCQaL+dS:000000000000000000000000000000000000qjTm Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2006 13:35:13 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20060609082424.22572.qmail@web54005.mail.yahoo.com> (Phil H.'s message of "Fri, 9 Jun 2006 01:24:24 -0700 (PDT)") Message-ID: <87irnacjvy.fsf@evinrude.uhoreg.ca> User-Agent: Gnus/5.110004 (No Gnus v0.4) Emacs/22.0.50 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-2.0 (services106.cs.uwaterloo.ca [129.97.152.132]); Fri, 09 Jun 2006 13:35:20 -0400 (EDT) X-Miltered: at demeter with ID 4489B157.002 by Joe's j-chkmail (http://j-chkmail.ensmp.fr)! X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV version 0.88.2, clamav-milter version 0.88.2 on localhost X-Virus-Status: Clean Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: hubert@uhoreg.ca Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto On Fri, 9 Jun 2006 01:24:24 -0700 (PDT), Phil H said: > Interesting discussion. > By not tamperproof, I imagine you are referring to the type of attacks > where an attacker does something to the first portions of ciphertext > in order to trick the user into revealing their password? Well, for one thing, once the filesystem is mounted, an attacker can still mess with your files. > I can't help wondering if it shouldn't be possible to hash the entired > encrypted device and seperately gpg encrypt that hashfile in order to > subsequently detect whether or not the ciphertext on the device had > been tampered with? Yes, it should be entirely possible. Although you probably want to gpg sign it instead of gpg encrypt it. But the downside is that you need to read the entire disk to check if it's been tampered with. I guess it all depends on your level of paranoia, and how much you're willing to put up with in the name of security. -- Hubert Chan - email & Jabber: hubert@uhoreg.ca - http://www.uhoreg.ca/ PGP/GnuPG key: 1024D/124B61FA (Key available at wwwkeys.pgp.net) Fingerprint: 96C5 012F 5F74 A5F7 1FF7 5291 AF29 C719 124B 61FA - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 11 02:22:17 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpDiW-0003s1-2g; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 02:22:12 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 11 Jun 2006 02:21:22 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.gmx.net ([213.165.64.21]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpDhX-0003mv-Uj for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 02:21:11 +0200 Received: (qmail 7688 invoked by uid 0); 11 Jun 2006 00:19:16 -0000 Received: from 84.175.9.29 by www107.gmx.net with HTTP; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 02:19:16 +0200 (CEST) X-Flags: 0001 Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 02:19:16 +0200 Message-ID: <20060611001916.196030@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Cc: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org From: Peter_22@gmx.de In-Reply-To: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> Subject: Re: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=22Gisle_S=E6lensminde=22?= X-Authenticated: #5663700 X-Mailer: WWW-Mail 6100 (Global Message Exchange) X-Priority: 3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,NO_REAL_NAME autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: Peter_22@gmx.de Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto "Gisle Sælensminde" wrote: >[...] One such weak link in earlier versions of > loop-aes (and as far as I know, still in cryptoloop) was the way each > block were encrypted, that allowed an attacker to see the the location > of the first change in each disk block when it changed. In that case, it > would not have helped with several loop devices or double encryption. > While the seriousness of the attack can be argued about, it shows that > several layers of encryption may not help if an attack is on a different > part of the system. Oh, that just reminds me of some guy called "Clemens Fruhwirth". (http://clemens.endorphin.org/aboutme) Maybe you want to visit his page. "I brought an 586/686 assembler version of AES to the kernel, then started to work on dm-crypt. I invented and implemented ESSIV for dm-crypt, and tried to implement another nice encryption mode, called LRW." I wondered what LRW might be ever since he mentioned it here. You suppose the way loop-aes uses the aes cipher, namely CBC, is insecure? In case Mr. Fruhwirth had published loop-aes with LRW I´d given it a try. But as things are it seems to be a good choice to use loop-aes as it is and take 2 or more loop devices. Ok, and that´s all on this case. Good luck on your anaysis of the cryptosystem. I only fear I can´t help with that:-( Regards, Peter -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal für Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 11 11:48:25 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpMYP-0002zn-Rh; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 11:48:21 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 11 Jun 2006 11:47:52 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.tnnet.fi ([217.112.240.26]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpMXj-0002yw-V6 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 11:47:40 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.tnnet.fi (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EA313B0B45; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 12:47:31 +0300 (EEST) Received: from mail.tnnet.fi ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 10640-02; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 12:47:29 +0300 (EEST) Received: from a64.adsl.tnnet.fi (a64.adsl.tnnet.fi [217.112.242.64]) by mail.tnnet.fi (Postfix) with ESMTP id 907713ADB22; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 12:47:29 +0300 (EEST) Message-ID: <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 12:47:28 +0300 From: Jari Ruusu To: Peter_22@gmx.de Cc: Gisle =?iso-8859-1?Q?S=E6lensminde?= , linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> <20060611001916.196030@gmx.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mail.tnnet.fi Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Received-SPF: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: jariruusu@users.sourceforge.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Peter_22@gmx.de wrote: > "Gisle S=E6lensminde" wrote: > >[...] One such weak link in earlier versions of > > loop-aes (and as far as I know, still in cryptoloop) was the way each > > block were encrypted, that allowed an attacker to see the the locatio= n > > of the first change in each disk block when it changed. In that case,= it > > would not have helped with several loop devices or double encryption. > > While the seriousness of the attack can be argued about, it shows tha= t > > several layers of encryption may not help if an attack is on a differ= ent > > part of the system. >=20 > Oh, that just reminds me of some guy called "Clemens Fruhwirth". > (http://clemens.endorphin.org/aboutme) > Maybe you want to visit his page. "I brought an 586/686 assembler versi= on > of AES to the kernel, then started to work on dm-crypt. I invented and > implemented ESSIV for dm-crypt, and tried to implement another nice > encryption mode, called LRW." > I wondered what LRW might be ever since he mentioned it here. LRW mode is more vulnerable to changed location disclosure than CBC mode. That is because each ciphertext block depends on only one plaintext block and the encryption keys. In CBC mode, ciphertext also depends on preceedi= ng plaintext blocks. The way IV is computed in loop-AES makes all ciphertext blocks depend on all plaintext blocks in 512 byte sector. IOW, loop-AES provides better protection against changed location disclos= ure than dm-crypt, cryptoloop, or ecryptfs. --=20 Jari Ruusu 1024R/3A220F51 5B 4B F9 BB D3 3F 52 E9 DB 1D EB E3 24 0E A9 = DD - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 11 13:51:24 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpOTP-0003k1-Hh; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 13:51:19 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 11 Jun 2006 13:50:56 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.gmx.de ([213.165.64.21] helo=mail.gmx.net) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpOSq-0003aU-HE for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 13:50:44 +0200 Received: (qmail 2411 invoked by uid 0); 11 Jun 2006 11:48:50 -0000 Received: from 84.175.60.71 by www014.gmx.net with HTTP; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 13:48:50 +0200 (CEST) X-Flags: 0001 Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 13:48:50 +0200 Message-ID: <20060611114850.245290@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Cc: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org, Gisle.Salensminde@bccs.uib.no From: Peter_22@gmx.de In-Reply-To: <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> <20060611001916.196030@gmx.net> <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> Subject: Re: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU To: Jari Ruusu X-Authenticated: #5663700 X-Mailer: WWW-Mail 6100 (Global Message Exchange) X-Priority: 3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,NO_REAL_NAME autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: Peter_22@gmx.de Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Jari Ruusu wrote: >[...] LRW mode is more vulnerable to changed location disclosure than CBC mode. > That is because each ciphertext block depends on only one plaintext block > and the encryption keys. In CBC mode, ciphertext also depends on > preceeding > plaintext blocks. The way IV is computed in loop-AES makes all ciphertext > blocks depend on all plaintext blocks in 512 byte sector. > > IOW, loop-AES provides better protection against changed location > disclosure > than dm-crypt, cryptoloop, or ecryptfs. Ok, I suppose this is good news! My knowledge about attacks on ciphers and galois fields is quite faint, but I seriously hope the maintanance of loop-aes will go on. Since many tutorials and websites focus on loop-aes I deem it the right choice. Knoppix includes loop-aes, SuSE does not, but that need not be a disadvantage. Clemens Fruhwirth seemed to be a wise guy but unfortunately he didn´t suggest a patch or some working files. Other mainline projects like truecrypt or parts of the standard linux kernel might be backdoored. The loop-aes readme could include advice on how to remove partition table and boot sector and some plugin for k3b to burn encrypted cd/dvd on-the-fly would be excellent, too. Regards, Peter -- "Feel free" – 10 GB Mailbox, 100 FreeSMS/Monat ... Jetzt GMX TopMail testen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/topmail - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 11 14:49:00 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpPN8-00089p-VN; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:48:55 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:48:37 +0200 (CEST) Received: from ms-1.rz.rwth-aachen.de ([134.130.3.130] helo=ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpPMN-000872-Ai for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:48:07 +0200 Received: from circe (circe.rz.RWTH-Aachen.DE [134.130.3.36]) by ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 Patch 2 (built Jul 14 2004)) with ESMTP id <0J0P008N34VV0H@ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de> for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:56 +0200 (MEST) Received: from talos.rz.RWTH-Aachen.DE ([134.130.3.22]) by circe (MailMonitor for SMTP v1.2.2 ) ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:55 +0200 (MEST) Received: from enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (enterprise.ram.RWTH-Aachen.DE [137.226.68.2]) by smarthost.rwth-aachen.de (8.13.1/8.13.1/1) with ESMTP id k5BClspQ018618 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:54 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 828225B777 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (enterprise [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 28031-02 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from tatooine.rebelbase.local (wintergate.ram.rwth-aachen.de [137.226.69.158]) by enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 045695B775 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: by tatooine.rebelbase.local (Postfix, from userid 500) id A42C62E006; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:53 +0200 (CEST) Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 14:47:53 +0200 From: markus reichelt Subject: Re: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU In-reply-to: <20060611114850.245290@gmx.net> To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Mail-followup-to: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Message-id: <20060611124753.GA4047@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Organization: still stuck in reorganization mode MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/signed; boundary=AhhlLboLdkugWU4S; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha1 Content-disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 X-PGP-Key: 0xC2A3FEE4 X-PGP-Fingerprint: FFB8 E22F D2BC 0488 3D56 F672 2CCC 933B C2A3 FEE4 X-Request-PGP: http://mareichelt.de/keys/c2a3fee4.asc X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> <20060611001916.196030@gmx.net> <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> <20060611114850.245290@gmx.net> Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: ml@mareichelt.de Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --AhhlLboLdkugWU4S Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable * Peter_22@gmx.de wrote: > Ok, I suppose this is good news! My knowledge about attacks on > ciphers and galois fields is quite faint, but I seriously hope the > maintanance of loop-aes will go on. Since many tutorials and > websites focus on loop-aes I deem it the right choice. Knoppix I've also seen that many tutorials focus on dm-crypt because it allegedly is easier to set up, is more modern, has a future, and such buzzwords. The only argument of using dm-crypt is its presence in mainline and thus hassle-free updating for the ordinary user; and that's a funny one too because dm-crypt does not focus on security first, as its author stated some time ago. dm-crypt's mission mantra seems to be "let's replace messy mainline loop-stuff, get it stable, then worry about better security." That's not a bad thing, because the (still) unmaintained mainline loop-support is going to be dropped completely as far as I know. They just should tell the story more clearly, and pretty please, with a cherry on top, not drop loop-support completely. > disadvantage. Clemens Fruhwirth seemed to be a wise guy but > unfortunately he didn??t suggest a patch or some working files. Actually, he did try to get his stuff included in mainline but made the same experience as Jari did: Not Gonna Happen. The kernel gurus' main concern is about maintainability and such. > Other mainline projects like truecrypt or parts of the standard > linux kernel might be backdoored. The loop-aes readme could include > advice on how to remove partition table and boot sector and some > plugin for k3b to burn encrypted cd/dvd on-the-fly would be > excellent, too. I suppose by mainline projects you mean standalone projects. Backdoors are always possible of course but with open source... let's just say it would not be a smart idea to put a backdoor into an open source programme. I second the addition of the partitiontable-less setup magic to the readme. And about that k3b plugin, I guess its author provides some kind of plugin-howto for users who like to contribute. My programming skills are rather rusty and I also lack the time for such a little fun project (who doesn't these days?) --=20 left blank, right bald winter wanted, NOW! --AhhlLboLdkugWU4S Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEjBD5LMyTO8Kj/uQRAjSDAJ9VNtVcDGKsxiRffotMAET+Qh/2PgCcDSpK luFEVQAup9YOeEJjSD4JrO4= =5dO5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --AhhlLboLdkugWU4S-- - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 11 15:12:16 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpPji-0002EM-AB; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:12:14 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:46 +0200 (CEST) Received: from ms-1.rz.rwth-aachen.de ([134.130.3.130] helo=ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpPj0-0002DW-9t for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:30 +0200 Received: from circe (circe.rz.RWTH-Aachen.DE [134.130.3.36]) by ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 Patch 2 (built Jul 14 2004)) with ESMTP id <0J0P008H25Z30J@ms-dienst.rz.rwth-aachen.de> for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:28 +0200 (MEST) Received: from talos.rz.RWTH-Aachen.DE ([134.130.3.22]) by circe (MailMonitor for SMTP v1.2.2 ) ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:27 +0200 (MEST) Received: from enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (enterprise.ram.RWTH-Aachen.DE [137.226.68.2]) by smarthost.rwth-aachen.de (8.13.1/8.13.1/1) with ESMTP id k5BDBRpe020383 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:27 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3601C5B777 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:27 +0200 (CEST) Received: from enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (enterprise [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 28031-08 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:26 +0200 (CEST) Received: from tatooine.rebelbase.local (wintergate.ram.rwth-aachen.de [137.226.69.158]) by enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id B08445B775 for ; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:26 +0200 (CEST) Received: by tatooine.rebelbase.local (Postfix, from userid 500) id 18FBC2E006; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:26 +0200 (CEST) Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:11:25 +0200 From: markus reichelt Subject: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU In-reply-to: <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Mail-followup-to: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Message-id: <20060611131125.GB4047@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Organization: still stuck in reorganization mode MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/signed; boundary="2B/JsCI69OhZNC5r"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha1 Content-disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 X-PGP-Key: 0xC2A3FEE4 X-PGP-Fingerprint: FFB8 E22F D2BC 0488 3D56 F672 2CCC 933B C2A3 FEE4 X-Request-PGP: http://mareichelt.de/keys/c2a3fee4.asc X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at enterprise.ram.rwth-aachen.de References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> <20060611001916.196030@gmx.net> <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: ml@mareichelt.de Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --2B/JsCI69OhZNC5r Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable * Jari Ruusu wrote: > IOW, loop-AES provides better protection against changed location > disclosure than dm-crypt, cryptoloop, or ecryptfs. I guess this includes recent truecrypt; according to its history page[1] it seems it prefers LRW mode of operation since v4.1, end of Nov 2005. [1] http://www.truecrypt.org/user-guide/?s=3Dversion-history --=20 left blank, right bald winter wanted, NOW! --2B/JsCI69OhZNC5r Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEjBZ9LMyTO8Kj/uQRAlYSAJwN5i307/bOHlCjP9820rSdvzVO6ACeM1Ca ea1r+IxEcWI1/ynDDs2wFC0= =OPqN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --2B/JsCI69OhZNC5r-- - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Sun Jun 11 15:23:53 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpPuw-0002rv-QW; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:23:50 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:23:40 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.tnnet.fi ([217.112.240.26]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpPqJ-0002g7-43 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 15:19:03 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.tnnet.fi (Postfix) with ESMTP id A06E03B0B45; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 16:19:01 +0300 (EEST) Received: from mail.tnnet.fi ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 10194-20; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 16:19:00 +0300 (EEST) Received: from a64.adsl.tnnet.fi (a64.adsl.tnnet.fi [217.112.242.64]) by mail.tnnet.fi (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0621B3AE36E; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 16:19:00 +0300 (EEST) Message-ID: <448C1842.3F4419BA@users.sourceforge.net> Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 16:18:58 +0300 From: Jari Ruusu To: markus reichelt Cc: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU References: <448443A6.4070209@cbu.uib.no> <20060611001916.196030@gmx.net> <448BE6B0.651B59AB@users.sourceforge.net> <20060611131125.GB4047@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mail.tnnet.fi Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: jariruusu@users.sourceforge.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto markus reichelt wrote: > * Jari Ruusu wrote: > > IOW, loop-AES provides better protection against changed location > > disclosure than dm-crypt, cryptoloop, or ecryptfs. > > I guess this includes recent truecrypt; according to its history > page[1] it seems it prefers LRW mode of operation since v4.1, end of > Nov 2005. Yes. loop-AES provides better protection against changed location disclosure than new LRW-mode truecrypt or old CBC-mode truecrypt. -- Jari Ruusu 1024R/3A220F51 5B 4B F9 BB D3 3F 52 E9 DB 1D EB E3 24 0E A9 DD - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Mon Jun 12 01:41:56 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpZME-0004FD-Fn; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 01:28:38 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Mon, 12 Jun 2006 01:28:10 +0200 (CEST) Received: from tapuz.safe-mail.net ([213.8.161.230]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpZLO-0004BG-Er for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 01:27:46 +0200 Received: from www.Safe-mail.net by tapuz.safe-mail.net with Safe-mail (Exim 4.52) id 1FpZKn-0002np-3U for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Sun, 11 Jun 2006 19:27:09 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=N1-0105; d=Safe-mail.net; b=Dn8EZa4iXQ1xjq8jAH+dQwlU3nLd0F3h9qtyR+4mx8tcnHNU955CrNqnEvbVds1h l7QIpdUyc/1GNIrrt3TdwyjzbQNpNVxaGs68nFCLJU1KjN9m4hiyGTF1PkIXENWb P6O0wL4Fk6OxggXPnJbptNG2I1G2GhVdklB+WI5hlC4=; Received: from pc ([84.130.217.51]) by Safe-mail.net with https Subject: root-crypto with loop-aes on debian-testing, 2.6.15-1-686 Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2006 19:27:08 -0400 From: reverend@Safe-mail.net To: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org X-SMType: Regular X-SMRef: N1-jlc_SJKVsU Message-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SMSignature: Zt4Bf+9i0nOjUqICus9GwWC4Mv1dSxRGr6eb7gbwBZO3jaTaWzH+ziSEdIzugN9p 6kD1+hJzsD4dWXDn/XN2GcCCa86R7Qy4M5IEtc/Kb1c9htkjfJ9+eusp5hTMip5V aulj373IoItqos+FjavKPWfTGbLid8U8xkuCKsontxg= Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,NO_REAL_NAME autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: reverend@Safe-mail.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto Hello-, I used the newest loop-aes.README (10.April 2006) to get my root-fs encrypted but failed with something like " no console found". I used debian testing, but the newest loop-aes-relevant packages from unstable, which I successfully use in multikey-mode on several other partions on another computer and on the test-laptop for this try. I managed to make a root-fs with dm-crypt via the ERPOSS4-Distri on the test-laptop but I don want to use dm-crypt and, additionally, I have good reasons not to trust the german government or any of his fuzzys, (and I do not want to give a really long passphrase 4 times because dm-crypt do not feed random-PW for swap). I heard rumors about udev, =>2.6.15 and changes of ramdisk........ I worked with the readme precisely point for point but sometimes I used some *.deb instead of the tarball if I remember well. Can anyone, especially when called Jari, give a hint ? regards, Reverend - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Mon Jun 12 08:16:17 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpfiU-0008U5-Ac; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 08:16:02 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Mon, 12 Jun 2006 08:15:23 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.tnnet.fi ([217.112.240.26]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpfhX-0008Rt-Vy for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 08:15:04 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.tnnet.fi (Postfix) with ESMTP id 786E13AF172; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 09:14:58 +0300 (EEST) Received: from mail.tnnet.fi ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 04940-07; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 09:14:57 +0300 (EEST) Received: from a64.adsl.tnnet.fi (a64.adsl.tnnet.fi [217.112.242.64]) by mail.tnnet.fi (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18CB63AE233; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 09:14:57 +0300 (EEST) Message-ID: <448D0660.57B1FCC2@users.sourceforge.net> Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2006 09:14:56 +0300 From: Jari Ruusu To: reverend@Safe-mail.net Cc: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org Subject: Re: root-crypto with loop-aes on debian-testing, 2.6.15-1-686 References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mail.tnnet.fi Received-SPF: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00 autolearn=no version=3.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.1 (2004-10-22) on humbolt.nl.linux.org X-Spam-Level: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: jariruusu@users.sourceforge.net Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto reverend@Safe-mail.net wrote: > Hello-, I used the newest loop-aes.README (10.April 2006) to get my root-fs > encrypted but failed with something like " no console found". Most likely this is caused by missing /dev/console device node on your encrypted root partition. Step 17 of April-10-2006 README is supposed to make sure that static /dev/console device node exists on your encrypted root partition. When udev starts up, it mounts a newly created file system on top of /dev, so that original static nodes are unaccessible. So, after udev is started, it looks like that there is a /dev/console device node, but your real udev-less encrypted file system does not have that device node. To fix, do this: 1) boot knoppix 2) mount partition where your key file is 3) mount your encrypted root partition on /mnt 4) run these commands: mknod -m 600 /mnt/dev/console c 5 1 mknod -m 666 /mnt/dev/null c 1 3 mknod -m 666 /mnt/dev/zero c 1 5 5) unmount /mnt and key file partitions 6) reboot However, if your encrypted root partition already contains above mentioned static device nodes, then please post your bootloader configuration and time when that error occours (before or after entering passphrase). -- Jari Ruusu 1024R/3A220F51 5B 4B F9 BB D3 3F 52 E9 DB 1D EB E3 24 0E A9 DD - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ From linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Mon Jun 12 11:57:20 2006 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=humbolt) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with esmtp (Exim 4.22) id 1FpjAZ-0007MH-Dg; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 11:57:15 +0200 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-crypto); Mon, 12 Jun 2006 11:56:43 +0200 (CEST) Received: from web54006.mail.yahoo.com ([206.190.36.230]) by humbolt.nl.linux.org with smtp (Exim 4.22) id 1Fpj4c-00070C-J9 for linux-crypto@nl.linux.org; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 11:51:06 +0200 Received: (qmail 92752 invoked by uid 60001); 12 Jun 2006 09:50:08 -0000 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Message-ID:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=MUWQq2fD4HQ9edpDBqwB6y9YyEO2M4n8jmyZ/3Yx7ES9ukIrCgr2gWmUVGQex5E97V5ZGOKRSo7NhtMwoVMYdS525709LJmnnxg4yiDFHR5rJpz0doYBYwxrx6rGpWeXFEQyaBICQqZEl5GD/yAMQWBUScElcPEPuvv+X0FwCKU= ; Message-ID: <20060612095008.92750.qmail@web54006.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [87.203.49.115] by web54006.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Mon, 12 Jun 2006 02:50:08 PDT Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2006 02:50:08 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil H Subject: Re: Re: Loop-AES and Twofish on 64-bit CPU To: Peter_22@gmx.de Cc: linux-crypto@nl.linux.org In-Reply-To: <20060611114850.245290@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-626969054-1150105808=:78957" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org Errors-to: linux-crypto-bounce@nl.linux.org X-original-sender: philtickle200@yahoo.com Precedence: bulk List-help: List-unsubscribe: List-software: Ecartis version 1.0.0 List-Id: X-List-ID: List-subscribe: List-owner: List-post: List-archive: X-list: linux-crypto --0-626969054-1150105808=:78957 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Mr Fruhwirth (dm-crypt) and Mr Ruusu (loop-aes) have a bit of a interesting sparring history. Read back over the list to see some of this. For my money, loop-aes comes off as having much more credibility. The dm-crypt people have never convincingly responded to Jari's well-aimed criticisms. Instead they side track the debate with technobabble and arguments about threats not being significant. But you cannot get only "a little bit" pregnant. Peter_22@gmx.de wrote: Jari Ruusu wrote: >[...] LRW mode is more vulnerable to changed location disclosure than CBC mode. > That is because each ciphertext block depends on only one plaintext block > and the encryption keys. In CBC mode, ciphertext also depends on > preceeding > plaintext blocks. The way IV is computed in loop-AES makes all ciphertext > blocks depend on all plaintext blocks in 512 byte sector. > > IOW, loop-AES provides better protection against changed location > disclosure > than dm-crypt, cryptoloop, or ecryptfs. Ok, I suppose this is good news! My knowledge about attacks on ciphers and galois fields is quite faint, but I seriously hope the maintanance of loop-aes will go on. Since many tutorials and websites focus on loop-aes I deem it the right choice. Knoppix includes loop-aes, SuSE does not, but that need not be a disadvantage. Clemens Fruhwirth seemed to be a wise guy but unfortunately he didn´t suggest a patch or some working files. Other mainline projects like truecrypt or parts of the standard linux kernel might be backdoored. The loop-aes readme could include advice on how to remove partition table and boot sector and some plugin for k3b to burn encrypted cd/dvd on-the-fly would be excellent, too. Regards, Peter -- "Feel free" – 10 GB Mailbox, 100 FreeSMS/Monat ... Jetzt GMX TopMail testen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/topmail - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com --0-626969054-1150105808=:78957 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Mr Fruhwirth (dm-crypt) and Mr Ruusu (loop-aes) have a bit of a interesting sparring history.  Read back over the list to see some of this.

For my money, loop-aes comes off as having much more credibility.

The dm-crypt people have never convincingly responded to Jari's well-aimed criticisms.  Instead they side track the debate with technobabble and arguments about threats not being significant.  But you cannot get only "a little bit" pregnant.

Peter_22@gmx.de wrote:

Jari Ruusu wrote:
>[...] LRW mode is more vulnerable to changed location disclosure than CBC mode.
> That is because each ciphertext block depends on only one plaintext block
> and the encryption keys. In CBC mode, ciphertext also depends on
> preceeding
> plaintext blocks. The way IV is computed in loop-AES makes all ciphertext
> blocks depend on all plaintext blocks in 512 byte sector.
>
> IOW, loop-AES provides better protection against changed location
> disclosure
> than dm-crypt, cryptoloop, or ecryptfs.

Ok, I suppose this is good news! My knowledge about attacks on ciphers and galois fields is quite faint, but I seriously hope the maintanance of loop-aes will go on. Since many tutorials and websites focus on loop-aes I deem it the right choice. Knoppix includes loop-aes, SuSE does not, but that need not be a disadvantage. Clemens Fruhwirth seemed to be a wise guy but unfortunately he didn´t suggest a patch or some working files. Other mainline projects like truecrypt or parts of the standard linux kernel might be backdoored.
The loop-aes readme could include advice on how to remove partition table and boot sector and some plugin for k3b to burn encrypted cd/dvd on-the-fly would be excellent, too.

Regards,
Peter

--


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