Re: the cold-boot attack - a paper tiger?

[Phil <philtickle200@xxxxxxxxx>]

--- Phil <philtickle200@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> 
> --- Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > 
> > Because loop-aes *is* vulnerable to our attacks.
> > 
> > The keying material is in memory when we mount our
> > attack. We were able
> > to reliably extract keys required to decrypt the
> > data on the disk.
> > 
> 
> So I am right in saying that quitting X and
> overwriting  free memory as root with a utility such
> as smem after pulling down the loop will prevent key
> recovery?
> 
PS:  If so, why doesn't Jari just overwrite the slab
of memory containing the keys when pulling down the
loop? (I previously assumed loop-aes did this).


      

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