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Re: How about deniability? (read:http://www.zdnet.co.uk/print/?TYPE=story&AT=39269746-39020330t-10000025c)
Info wrote:
> Although I will agree that this provides a great deal of security for the
> data I don't think that it provides 'deniability'. In particular if the
> attack consists of physical possession of the computer and an analysis of
> the disk drive content without the attempt to boot it,
After handing over the passphrase to /dev/hda2 root partition, all hard disk
space is accounted for. Files on /dev/hda1 and /dev/hda2 are readable, and
user can prove that programs on /dev/hda2 root partition create random
encryption keys for /dev/hda3 and /dev/hda4 on each boot, and that user has
no way of knowing what earlier encryption keys were on those two partitions.
> and even more so if the usb key is available to the attacker.
Here user insists that /dev/hda2 is the root partition. That way all hard
disk space is accounted for. Attacker can prove existence of one small gpg
encrypted file on USB-stick for which user has forgotten passphrase.
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Jari Ruusu 1024R/3A220F51 5B 4B F9 BB D3 3F 52 E9 DB 1D EB E3 24 0E A9 DD
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Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/