Re: Announce loop-AES-v3.0b file/swap crypto package

[jerome etienne <jme@xxxxxxx>]

Jari Ruusu wrote:
> To modify encrypted data on hard disk partition means that attacker has to
> root the box first. If attacker successfully roots a box, it is "game over"
> securitywise right there. Only sane option after that is reinstallation
> and/or restore from known good backup.

well it is a valid argument if you assume the OS has been corrupted.
Nevertheless this assumption isnt mandatory, here is a scenario where it 
doesnt apply:
1. a user encrypt a whole removable disk with loop-aes
2. he goes in a conference and leave it unattended in a room (bad
   practice but it happen)
3. an attacker gets it, insert chosen data in it and put it back
4. the user replugs the removable device

=> with the current loop-aes, the attack succeed
   o the modification goes undetected and the user uses attacker's data
     as if they were legitimate.
=> with a loop-aes patched with authentication, the attack fails
   o it is detected by the authentication and the user can act
     appropriatly

my point is to make people aware of the security limit offered by the 
tool they use. After, they can do the knowledgeable decision to use them 
or not, depending on their own requirements. Thus they dont loose/leak 
important informations because they were not aware of those limits.


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Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive:       http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/