Re: Loop-AES, security concerns, stability of file backed loop-aes

[Christian Kujau <evil@xxxxxxxxxx>]

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Jari Ruusu schrieb:
> loop-AES is also vulnerable to attacker modifying ciphertext;
ciphertext is
> not authenticated and attacker tampered ciphertext will decrypt without
> detection. It is possible for attacker to revert whole file system
> ciphertext to some earlier version (if attacker had access and saved old
> ciphertext).

to access the ciphertext, the attacker must have access to the
(encrypted) partition / imagefile, right?

> My point is: secure software crypto in rooted or otherwise insecure box is
> impossible to achieve.

uh, <cough>, aaargh! you mean "100% secure software cry...", right?

i too think that "100% secure" is never possible, because of a lot of
things. but i also thought, loop-aes aims to be "quite secure", when it
comes to "the bad|good guys seize my harddisk". hm, but then they really
*have* access to the bare partitions and so they have access to the
ciphertext too and your mentioned ciphertext attacks are frightening me now.

i hope i've misunderstood you here...

Christian.
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BOFH excuse #311:

transient bus protocol violation
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